We consider a model of search vhen the distribution of prices (wages) is unknown.
Introduction 2/
A considerable literature-analyzes the behavior of an individual who is to buy one unit of a good in a market with differing prices for the good.
The consumer is assumed to sample, at a fixed cost, from a known probability distribution over a finite set of potential prices, and to minimize the expected sum of price plus search costs. The optimal strategy is characterized by a reservation price, with search ceasing as soon as a price quotation no higher than the reservation price is elicited.
Rothschild [2] is rightly critical of the assumption that the searcher behaves as if he knew the distribution of prices, and looks instead at an environment where a searcher with prior beliefs about the unknown price distribution "learns" through Bayesian updating of beliefs as prices are observed.
For this environment, the characterization which would be analogous to a reservation price is the reservation-price property: the existence of a threshold price function which determines a reservation price for each history of observed price offers. Rothschild establishes^the reservation-price property for an expected-cost minimizing search strategy, in the case where the searcher's prior beliefs have a Dirichlet distribution ( 
Let A(p,p) be the current prior over P for a searcher with history (y,p).
Note that
We maintain the assumption that the searcher's prior is a Dirichlet distribution (in which case updated beliefs are also Dirichlet), which has been completely characterized. 
i V (u,p,I) is the expected (indirect) utility for a consumer allowed to search only once, assuming history (u,p), and holding current income I
(after costs of this one allowed search have been paid). Designate for all T, so the V (u,p, I) converge.
it is clear that
so the optimal stopping policy is to cease search, upon eliciting price Rothschild [2] proves that the optimal strategy for an expected- When the searcher's objective is to minimize expected cost, the indirect effect of a lower price quote is solely the informational value of that price (the expected-cost evaluation of the effect upon updated beliefs).
In the case of a Dirichlet prior, the informational value of a lower price cannot swamp its direct effect, and Rothschild is able to prove that expected-cost-minimizing searchers with Dirichlet priors exhibit the reservation-price property.
However, the Dirichlet assumption is not sufficient to establish the reservation-price property for expected-utility-maxiraizing search, as now computing the indirect effect of observing a lower price must take into account the expected change in the marginal utility of leisure.
That is, while the nominal cost of search is fixed, the expected cost in foregone utility will depend on price observations. It is obvious that one or two searches will be optimal. Note that allowing for partial purchase after the first search would not alter the example.
Also, as the example relies only upon the value of the indirect utility function at a finite number of points, a smooth utility function approximating the w function above would not change the conclusion.
Similarly any sufficiently small perturbation of this utility function will give rise to the same search behavior. In particular, the preferences over x and L could have been strictly monotonic and convex without altering the conclusion.
5.
A Reservation-Price Theorem
The following property is useful for reservation-price behavior: The proof, which is nearly parallel to Rothschild ' s argument, is presented in the Appendix. implies, for all positive integers, s: -max{u( Pl ,I-c), V
In the right-hand side of (14), the terms in brackets within Z 
Proof:
The left-hand side of (15) 
The first inequality comes from Lemma 1, the second from the induction hypothesis, the third from property (*). If C > A, then B^A, and J = B -C.
If C < A, either B < A and J = A-A=0_<B-C, or B > A and J=B-A<_B-C. So J < B -C, and (16) provides the desired conclusion. 
The first inequality is by convention, the second is property (*) . To show J j< A -C, four cases must be considered:
